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l. INTRoDUcrroN
In the Netherlands as elsewhere, the topic of deference to the adminisffation is an
important doctrine that continues to provoke much debate. This doctrine, which is also
referred to as the limited judicial review of administrative actions, is the subject of
dynamic developments. The exact role that the court should play in the review of
administrative aclions remains a contentiots issue. If the 
"o.rrt ".rg"g., in an in-depth,intensive review, it may be accused of wrongly encroaching on the administration,s
territory and thus failing to obserwe the division of duties desired under constitutional
law 
- 
in doing so, it would usurp the function of the administration. on the other
hand, if it acts with restraint, it may be accused of offering inadequate legal protection.
Thus, the development of this doctrine reflecb a continuous search foi a proper
balance' In the Netherlands, additional facton include the srrucure of the systeni of
legal protection, the influence of the European convention on Human Rights(ECHR) and the law of the European (Jnion (EU law), as will become clear in ihis
contribution.
The focus of this contribution is the relationship benveen the judiciary and the
administration. How has this relationship developed and what are the expectations for
the future? consequently, another irnportant aspect of the judiciary's role 
- 
its
relationship with the legislature and legislation 
- 
will not be addressed.2 Still, the
legislarure does have a key role in determining the judiciary's position in relation to the
administration. Alier all, when powers are being conferred to adnrinistrative bodies, it is
often the legislanrre that defines the scope those bodies have to exercise the powen in
question. For example, the legislature may confer policy-making discretion on an
administrative body, meaning that this body itself may, in principle, decide whether or
not to make use of a particular power. Or, it may confer assessment discrefion, enabling
the adnrinistrative body iself to determine whether a jurisdicrion requirement has been
met,3for instance in cxes where the existence of a 'threat to public order' is a
prerequisite for the use of a certain power.
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For our cliscussion of 'deference', we have opted for a chronological approach that is
preceded by a brief outline of the development of the system of iegal protection against
,lr. gorr.rrrr-nenr in the Netherlands. The following topics will be addressed in
,.q.1Jn."' an inffoduction to the Dutch system of legal protecfion against the
goir".rrrrr.n, (Section 2), the development of the doctrine on the basis of the 7949
S.rpr"r',r. Cotirt juclgmerrt in Doetinche-m(Section 3), the requirements for judicial legal
p-t".tion agai,rit gorr"rllm.,rt decisions set in 1985 by the European Court of FIuman
iUgft in Binthan (Section 4), the General Administrative Law Act as the green light
foJftrrther development of the doctrine with hannonisir.rg effect on various subareas of
administrative iaw (Secrion 5), and the conclusion, with an otltlook for the future
(Section 6). It should be noted at the outset that this is an outline disclssion.
2. TTfiDUTCH CONTEXT: THE SYSTEM OFLEGALPROTECTION AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT4
In the Netherlands, the early nventieth centrlry was marked by debate on the issue of
who could best offer legal protection: the administration or the judiciary' In 1905,
Minister ofJusrice Loeffsubmitted legislative proposals aimed at introducing a general
adnrinistrative law Act. These proposals met with fierce opposition, notably fi'om the
fanrous consrirudonal law scholar Struycken. In his classic essay 'Administratie oJ rethter?'
[Aclministration orJudiciary?]s, he argued that the control of administrative actions by
an independent jutliciary was fairly pointless. In this 'modem' time of parlianrentary
d.mo.racy, primary conffol of the adminisffation had to be exercised by Parliament,
not by . j"fu. appointed for life. Moreover, he was of the opinion that the judiciary
could'noi .ont oi administrative actions in an in-depth manner, asserting that the court
lacked the expertise to do so. Dtle to the many, broad discretionary,powers at the
adnrinistrationis disposal, a review based 'on the law' would have little significance.
After all, the law atached few specific requirements to those discretionary powers
which decisions had to satisfy. If the coult were to review beyond the law, it would
encroach on rhe duties of the adnrinistration and disrupt the separation of powers. 'The
court may not usurp the function of the adminiscration.' In Stmycken's view. society
would be better oflif the actions of adnrinisrradve bodies were to be reviewed by the
adrninistration itse[ in the fonn of an administrative appeal. Such an appeal involves
the dispute being resolved by the adnrinistration itself, often by a higher administrative
body. Conversely, Loeff took the view that the administration should not be
responsible for approving its own actions. Rather, in a state under the nrle of law, the
adnrinistration hi.l to b. subject to control by an independent judiciary. In order to
strengthen that independence, he proposed increasing judges' salaries and bringing
jurisJicdon under the ordinary court (and not a separate administrative court).
-To 
date, this discussion has not resuited in the Netherlands nuking a choice of principle
between an administrative appeal and an independent judrciary. This means that the
debate regarding the division of duties berween the administration and the judiciary is
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those that require specific expertise and those with a supranational character, as well as
combinations thereol
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long-standing and still ongoing, and that general adninistrative adjudication did not get
off the gound until a relatively late stage. As regards individuai Acts, Parliarnent did
venttlre to take the step of appoincing a special administrative coutt as the competent
adjudicating body as regards certain cypes of decision, but the step towards an
administrative court that could rule on all adnrinistrative decisions was only taken at a
late stage (and has still not been raken completely). Although a Gw special
adnrinistrative law tribunals were established as from around 1900, acfininistrative appeal
(lega1 protection within the administrative pillar) remained an irnportant fomr of legal
proteccion.
Appeal to the Crown was a special form of administrative appeal, which ultimately
involved the dispute being resolved by Royal Decree (signed by the King and
countenigned by a Minister). Appeal to the Crown was applied in rnany diflbrent types
of dispute, including environmental disputes. The Council of State played a key role in
appeals to the Crown, because the entire process took place belore the Adnrinistrative
Dispute Department of the council of State. while the crown had the power to
depart from the Council of State's advice, it did so only sporadically. Furthermore,
there were additional conditions attached to this so-cailed 'contrarian approach'. These
rrratters were regulated in legrslation such as the Adnrinistrative Decisions Appeal Act
(Wet Beroep administratieue beschikkingen).
compared with other European countries, the appeal to the crown fornred an
exceptional rernedy. The Netherlands was firnr1y convinced that an appeal to the
Crown oliered a unique and valuable fomr of legal protection. Flowever, as evident
fronr the Batthem case (to be discussed below in Section 3), the Netherlands was
ultimately corrected on this point by the Errropean Court of Human Rights.
And so, the Dutch system of adnrinisrrative adjudicarion developed step by srep. In the
beginning, the main rule was legal protection by the administration. However, over the
course of time it became increasingly conrrron to set rlp and appoint adjudicating
tribunals that were cornpetent to adjudicate on particular legrslation, resulting in a
systen of numerous special adjudicating tribunals. A Gw rribunals were allocated so
many duties that they became large, guiding courts. The Appeals Tribunals adjudicated
on nany areas of socia-l security law. Subsequendy, citizens could appeal to the Central
Appeal Tribunal, a tribunal that also acquired public service jurisdiction and that has
now existed for over a cenftrry. After the Second World War, the Trade and Industry
Appeals Tribunal was established to deal with economic administrative law. In due
course, this tribunai also acquired an important function as appeal court. In tax disputes,
the competent coult is traditionally the ordinary court (the tax divisions at the District
courts, coufts of Appeal and the Snpreme court). \vith the implementation of the
Adnrinistrative Decisions (Appeals) Act (Wet administratiue rechtspraak ouerheids-
beschikkingen) ]n 1.976, the council of State was designated as the 'general'
administrative court. As a result, in addition to the appeal to the Crown, the Council of
State also acquired a process in which it was to act as a court, and thus did havejurisdicrion to render the final judgment in a dispute. If a citizen could not subnrit his
dec.ision to a special administrative coult, the Council of State's Jurisdiction Division
heard the appeal as the general administrative court. This court was thus presented with
all manner of disputes, regarding decisions by, for instance, the Municipal Executive,
Provincial Executive and the Minister.
The civil court has continued to play a supplemental role in this fiagmented systern. In
the ear\ rwentieth century, the S'preme Co'rt held that the State, provinces,
urunicipalities, water authorities, etc., as (public law) legal entities, could act unlawftrlly
.t t:24
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(Arricle 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code). The civil court has jurisdiction to take
cognisance of proceedings based on unlawful act in the absence of a judicial procas under
adlministrative law with lrlrirn, safeguards.G If there was a judicial process under
administrarive law in which the citizen could present his complaint regarding unlawful
act, the civil court acknowledged that it had no role to play and declared the citizen's
claim inadmissible. If the citizen could not avail himself of the administrative court
(because, for example, his litigation did not concem a 'decision'), the civil court took
on the case. In this way, the civil court began to provide supplementary legal
protection, and case law emerged on the division of duties between the civil and
administrative courts. Ard, with all the different judicial processes and case law on the
allocarion of jurisdiction, a varied patchwork of forms of legal proteclion against the
governnent arose.
fuotably, in light of all of the above, the Netherlands does not have any constitutional
court. indeed, the courts are prohibited from assessing primary legislation against the
Constitution. However, this is large\ compensated by the fact that the cours - more
specifically, all courts regardless of their position in the judicial structure - can and must
,rr.r, 
"g"inrt conv.ntiori 
provisions ,o.h ,, those from the ECHR and EIJ law'7
For more than a decade now, administrative adjudication in the Netherlands has been
increasingly focused on final dispute resolution.8 As a rule, the court can no longer limit
iself to merely annulling an administrative decision; it must use all available means to
resolve the dispute as definitively as possible. For example, administrative courts are
increasingly inclined to consider whether a new decision by the administration is still
,r.."rr"ry If that ls the case, the courts attempt to elaborate on what the parties will
have to do after the judgment, before the administration renden a new decision
replacing the annulled decision. This, too, means looking for a proper balance between
definitive judicial dispute resolution on the one hand and respecting administrative
discretion (in terms of poliry-making and assessment) on the other. In the Explanatory
Memorandum to the article in the General Administrative Law Act that urges the court
to resolve the dispute before it as definitive\ as possible (Article 8:41a of that Act),
consideration is also given to the limits of constitutional law in this regard. It states that
the court will settle the case and does not have to confine itself to annulment and
referral to the administrative body: "if and in so far as its constitutional position and the
available information perrnit this."e Flere too, then, in a sense it concems an issue in the
area ofdeGrence.
3. Trn orvnr,oPMENT oF THE DocrRrNE oN THE BASIS oF THE SUPREME
COURT I.IDGMENT IN D OETINCIIEM
Having sketched the context of the Dutch system of legal protection against the
govemment, we can now focus in more detail on the development of the doctrine of
defer.nce. Before 7949, there was no clarity in Dutch case law regarding the issue of
6 Cf, Supreme Court 31 December 1915, Atr 19L6, p. 407 (Culdunond-Noordwijkerhout).
7 See further ljzman, Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2010.
8 See, in particular, VAR-Comrnksie rechtsbescherming, De toekomst uan de rechtsbescherming tegm
tle ouerheirl, Van toetsing naar geschilbeslechrlzg, [Administrative Law Association Committee
on Legal Protection, The Future of Legal Protection against the Government], The Hague
20L4.
') Kamerstukker [Parliamentary Documents] ll2009/10,32450, no.3, p. 55.
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whether, and if so to what extent, a court is entitled to review the adminisharion's
policy choices. Sorne argued that courts should not be permitted to concem themselves
with this area at all due to their respective corxtitutional positions and that legal
protection in this respect_ would only be possible within the administrarive pillar(administrative appeal). othen took the view rhat the court 
- 
being independent from
the administration 
- 
should indeed be able to play a role. This in fact eihoes the old
discussion between Loeffand Struycken as described above.
In a case prompted by a housing requisition by a municipality based on an emergenry
law designed to solve the most acute housing shortage after the Second World Wa., the
Supreme Court got the opportunity to clari$r rhe matrer. A mentally ill married couple
was confronted with such a requisition for the billeting of their house. They lodged an
objection to this before the court, based on their mental vulnerability. The municipality
defended itself with the argument that the legislature had given it full discretion to
requisition a house and that such a decision was deemed to be e{Ecient. The couple
argued that in their case, partly in view of their special position, the decision would
have entirely disproportionate effects. The lower courts found for the couple and
accepted that there had been abuse of the law in the case in hand. The municipaliry
appealed to the supreme court, taking the posirion that, in making such a finding, the
lower cours had wrongly encroached on its discretionary poJicy--aking po*..r. Th"
Supreme court overruled the judgmens of the lower courts ancl introduced the
arbitrariness fonnula. This means that the court must respect the administration's
discretionary powe$ in ternr of its policy-making and asse.rment, and permits the
c.ourt to intervene only if there is an "arbitrary act". According to the Supreme Court,
this is the case if "the requisitioning authority, when weighing the relevant inrerests,
could not reasonably have ar:rived at a requisition, and tro *.ighitrg of those interests
must therefore be deemed to have been made."10 Thus, loosely translated, the Supreme
Court held that the court is not permitted to intervene if lt itself is of the opinion that a
decision is not reasonable or is disproportionate, but may only do so if a reasonable man
could never have reached the decision in question. The background to this approach is
the relationship between thejudiciary, the legislature and the administration, ltr *tri.h
the judiciary is considered to have the least democraric legitimacy. Incidentally, the
Supreme Court ultimately decided in this case that the prohibirion against arbirrariness
had not been infinged and thus found for the municipaliry.
The origin of this approach is not absolutely ceftain. However, it is assumed that the
suprenre court.pardy drew its inspiration from the English wednesbury case law that
began in 7948.11 In Wednesbury, the English couft introcluced a test of reasonableness
with regard to administrative decisiorx.
Based on the Doetinchem-judgment, it subsequently became established case law of the
civil courts and the administrative courBl2 that courts must perform a limited review of
government decisions if the issue at hand is whether the administration made a policy
choice that is legally acceptable when weighing the relevant interes*, o, h., .oi".tly
interpreted vague standards.l3
10
l1
12
13
Supreme court 25 February 1949, NJ 1.949/558 (Doetinchem housing requisirion).
Associated Provincial Picure Ltd. v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1K.8.-22i. Cf.
Groenwegen 2014.
council ofState'sJurisdiction Division,23 october 1979, AB 19Bo/1gg (Sr. Bavo).
c_f van wijk, Konijnenbelt & van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrechr [chapters onAdministrative Law],
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4. INtBnnnnzzo: THE EURoPEAN Courr or HuneN Rrcrrrs DEMANDS
JUDICIAL LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT DECISIONS IN
BENTHEM
As stated, the Netherlands was firmly convinced that an appeal to the Crown referred
to in Section 2 offered a unique and valuable form of legal protection. Mr Benthan
contested this and lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights to
the effect that the Crown was not an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights
found in favou of Banthemrn 1985.14 That was a remarkable judgment in two respecm.
Fintly, it transpired that a dispute regarding an environmental permit (in those days a
'Nuisance Act Licence', fell within the concept of 'civil rights and obligations' from
Article 6 ECHR. Whether the national system qualifies a certain act as coming under
'administrative law' or 'private law' is thus not decisive. The European Court of
Human Rights gave its own interpretation to the concept 'civil righa and obligations',
resulting in administrative law largely fllling under the safeguard of Article 6 ECHR.
Consequently, a form of independent and impartial adminisration of justice in
accordance with Article 6 ECHR had to be introduced to deal with the acts of
administrarive bodies. Secondly, it emerged that the Dutch appeal to the Crown did
not meet the European requirements for independent and impartial administration of
justice, because the Crown is part of the administration. Following this judgment, the
appeal to the Crown was abolished and appeal to the independent (administrative)
court was ultimately made available in all cases.
It nray be concluded that the Banthemjudgment profoundly changed legal protection
against the govemment in the Netherlands. This judgment also ofGn a safeguard
against the judicial control of administrative actions being abolished or restricted once
again. The fact that this is necessary became evident, for example, from the proposals
made by a working group of administraton who opposed the juridification of public
administration.lt Since then, there have been increasing calls for restriction ofjudicial
control, in particular with regard to infrastmctural projects that are said to suffer too
much delay as a result of this control. 16 Flowever, thanks to Benthem, it is established
that this control must be mainained and that solutions for any resulting problems must
be sought within that framework.17 A comrnittee that considered the future of legal
protection against the govemment, comrnissioned by the Administrative Law
Association (Vurniging uoor Butuursrech) firlly endoned this principle and made
proposals for enhancing this legal protection within the Benthem precondidons. They
Deventer: Kluwer 2014, pp.332-337; De 'W'aard 2016; Schl<jsels & Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht
in de sociale rechtsstaat [Administrative Law in the Social State under the Rule of Law],
Deventer: Kluwer 2017, pp. 37 4-37 5.
14 European Court of Human Rights 23 October 1,985, AB 7986/1, annotated by E.M.H.
Hirsch Ballin, AY 1986, 102, annotated by EAA (Benthetn t. NederlanS; see also T.
Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emmerik, AB-Klasiek [ClassicJudgments in Administrative Law]
2076/8 (Deventer: Kluwer 2016).
15 Bestuur in gerling fludgrng the Administration], Haarlem 1997.16 Cf N.SJ. Koeman, 'Versnelling in het bestuursprocevecht' f,Acceleration in Adnrinistrative
Procedural Lawl, M m R [Environment and Law] 2008, no. 4.17 Cf J.A.M. van Angeren, 'Mensenrechtan m onaJhankelijke bestuursrechtspraak' [Human Rights
and Independent Administrative Adjudication], in: Barkhuysen, Van Emmerik and Loof
(eds.), Ceschakeld recht[Linkedlaw], Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer 2009, p. 1,-1'1.
28
DereReNce ro rHE AorvrrNrsrnarioN rNJuDrcrAl REVTEw:
THE CASE OF THE NNTUTNI-RNPS
paid a great deal of attention in this regard to improving the dispute resolution capacity
of administrative procedural law and argued that the court itself should rnore often
resolve the matter, whether or not after the administration has been given the
opportunity^ via a so-called adrninistrative loop to recti4r any shortcomings in a
decision. 18 This report formed the prelude ro the amendments to administrarive
procedural law that have meanwhile been implemented. As the appeal to the crown in
fact performed oumtandingly in terms of its dispute resolution capacity, it proved a
source of inspiration for the report and the amendmen$. However, it must be avoided
that the administrative court is in fact increasingly forced to usurp the administration's
function. However, the Strasbourg case law also offen a saGguard in this respect, with
Albert Benthem as a 'standard bearer'.
5. Trm Gnxnner, ApunvrstRerrvE LAtv Acr AS THE GREEN LrcHT FoR
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE WITH HARMONISING EFFECT
ON VARIOUS SUBAREAS OF ADMINISTRATTVE LAW
'With the implementation of the General Adnrinistrative Law Act in 1994, the Supreme
Court's adoption of limited judicial review in Doetinchun came briefly under scmtiny
once again. That was triggered by the codification of the principle of proportionality in
Article 3:4(2) of the General Administrative Law Act, which provides that "the aclvene
consequences of a decision for one or more interested parties may not be
disproportionate to the objects to be served by the decision".
The District Court of Roerrnond construed this to mean a standard directed to the
court whereby it had to review itself the proportionality of the decision placed before
it, for the grant of consent for the construction of a store. According to the District
court, the new Article 3:4(2) of the General Administrative Law Act was intendecl to
break with the established case law on limited review. Flowever, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Division imrnediately corrected this on appeal in 1996: "this provision,
directed to the administration, was not intended by the legislature to intensifi judicial
review (...)" and "(..) the aim was to prompt restraint by the court when reviewing the
weighing of interesb by the administration". And furthermore: "the District Court
should have limited itself to the question of whether the weighing of the relevant
interests was so disproporrionate that it must be concluded that the appellanr (...) could
not reasonably have come to the decision to grant the exemption requestecl."le
In otherwords, a return to Doetinchem, aibeitwith an exception, by reason ofArticle 6
ECHR, for punitive administrative sanctions on which the court itself ls required to
rule without restraint on propoltion^hty.to As regards punitive administrative sanctions,
the Adrninistrative Jurisdiction Division held as follows: "Article 6 of the Convenrion
for the Protection of F{uman Rights and Fundamenral Freedoms, which applies to the
imposition of a penalty such as the once concemed here, entails that the courr must
18 Administrative Iaw Associacion Comrnittee on Legal protection 2004.
'e Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Councii of State, ,48 [fudgments in
Administrative Law] 1997 /93, AB-Klassiek [classic Judgments in Adminisrarive Law]
^. 
2016/22, annotated by B.w.N. de waard (Deventer: Kluwer 2016) (Maxk and praxis).20 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the council of State, 4 June 1,996, p 1997 /772,(Huisrnan/APIQ. See further M.L. van Enrrnerik & C.M. Sarts, Euenredige besnrurlijke boetes
[Proportionate administrative penalties] (Preliminary advice VAR, Den-Haag: Boorn201,4
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review, without restraint, whether the penalty imposed by the Minister in the specific
case is in accordance with the principle of proportionalittl'"21
Another period then commenced in which this line of case law encountered relatively
little resistance and in which the administrative court made pafticular efforts not to
encroach on the administration's territory in situations involving discretionary powers
with regard to policy-making and assessrnent. This approach even gained an additional
(theoretical) basis in the iiterature.22
Rernarkably, in environmental-law matten the Adnrinistrative Jurisdiction Division of
the Council of State still perfomred a full review up to 1998. This was a legacy frorn
the time of the appeal to the Crown, a fonn of administrative appeal to a higher
administrative body where the problem with constitutional relationships that was
encountered by the independent court did not apply. Even after the abolition ofthis
appeal to the Crown as a result of tt'e Benthemjudgrnent discussed above, and appeal to
the administrative court was made available in environmenal disputes, the practice of
intensive review remained gruding for quite some time. Until that tirne the
Adnrinistrative.furisdiction Division e{fectively determined what was in the interest of a
good living environment, which was at odds with the practice in other legal areas sttch
as planning and zoning law. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division finally put an end
to this trntenable special position in a judgment that was dLrbbed Die Wende by analogy
with the developmenc in Germany around the fall of the Berlin 'Wa11.23 The Division
held: "The respondent has a certain assessrnent discretion, which is limited, inter alia,
by what ensues from the most recent generally accepted environmental insights".
The judicial review of the acts or onrissions of superwisory authorities under
adnrinistrative 1aw is restrained in accordance with the points outlined above as well.
According to the Supreme Court, bearing in nind the extensive discretionary powers
in terms of its poJicy-making and assessrnent that are vested in those supervisory
authorities, and given the risk in question and the circumstances of which the
supervisory authority was aware, the question to be answered by the court is whether
the supervisory authority could reasonably have adopted the poiicy as regards conffol
and supervision (in the event of general supervisory failures), or could have arived at
the acts in question (in the event of specific super-visory failures). According to the
Supreme Court, courts must conduct a limited review of such matterx, with due
observance of all interess, the circumstances at the time in question and the knowledge
at that time. In other words, it is not about deternrining in hindsight whether a
cliflbrent decision would have been better.2a
21 Adrninistrative Jurisdiction Division 27 Jan:uary 2010, AB [Judgments in Adrnirustrative
Law] 2010 / 48, annotated by O J.D.M.L. Jansen.
zz By EJ.Daalder & M. Schreuder-Masblom, Balonu:ren bouen nul [Balancing above Zero],
NTB [DutchJourna] for Adnrinistrative Law] 2000, pp.214-221.23 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, 21 April 1.998, AB [fudgments
in Adtninistrative Law] 1,998/1,99, annotated by G.Jurgens (Die Wentle). See on this topic
T.C. Leernans, De toetsing door rle bestuursrechter in milieugescftll/or [Review by the
Adrninistrative Court in Environmental Disputes] (dis. Leiden), The Hague: Boom 2008.
24 Cf. Supreme Court 13 October 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2077 (Vie d'Or); Supreme
Court2l November 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3349 (AFM-DSB); Supreme Court 2June
2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:987 (Zalco).
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6- CoNcrusroN, vITH AN ourlooK FoR THE FUTTIRE: AFTER
HARMONISATION, MOVING TOY/ARDS DIFFERENTIATION AND A
GREATER FOCUS ON PROPORTIONALITY, BUT'WITH LIMITS DUE TO THE
SPECIFIC EXPERTISE OF THE ADMINISTRATION
6.1 Modng touarils dffirentiation and afocus on Trogtorttionality
It is only in recent years that this established case law has been seriously called into
question once again, but this fime the arguments seenl to resonate more than before. It
has been argued that, based on the requirement of eftbccive legal protection, it is
necessaly for the adnrinistrative court to conduct a tnore intensive review, certainly
when fundamental righB are at issue.2s A court that exercises too much restraint woulcl
also create the risk of an administration devoid of responsibility and lax in its exercise of
due care in the knowledge that the court allows much leeway.
These signals have been cautiously picked up in the case law, but only as regards non-
punitive adrninistrative sanctions with a major impact, such as in the context of
integrity screening that could lead to the refusal and/or withdrawal of pennits.26 In
addition, reGrence may be made to a judgment of the Adnrinistrative Jurisdiction
Division regarding a decision on the maximum amount of natural gas to be extracted in
Noord-Nederland, which decision was raken by the Minister on the basis of a
discretionary power. In view of the possible earthquake risks and the associated dangen
for residents, the Division intensified its review in comparison with previous judgnrents.
It did so primarily by givin^g addicional focus to the proporcionaliry and proper
substantiation of the decision.tt under rhe influence of the ECHR and EU law (ihe
Procedure Directive), immigration law has seen review intensi$r as well. The
AdminisrrativeJurisdiction Division held as follows: "It follows fi-on the above that the
administrative review of the Strte Secretary's position regarding the credibility of an
account of the reasons for requesting asylum has a mixed character if a foreign national's
account of the reasons for requesting asylunr rests partly on statenlents ancl suppositions
that are not substantiated with evidence. Most aspects and elements of a decision can be
reviewed by the adnrinistrative couft in ternx of whether the State Secretary correctJy
took the position he adopted. If the State Secretary has decision-making discretion on
aspecB and elements of a decision, specificaliy when assessing the credibiliry of a foreigr
national's slatements and suppositions that are not substanciated with evidence, tle
adnrinistrative court will have to review whether the State Secretary did not wrongly
take the position that the account of the reasons for requesting asylum lacked
credibility, albeit that in that case too the adminisrradve court nrusr review the care
taken in and reasons given for the decision-rnaking of the State Secretary when
exercising that decision-making discrerion. consequently, the judicial review of a
posicion ofthe Strte Secretary regarding the credibility ofan account ofthe reasons for
T. Barkhuyselr et al,, Adequate rechtsbeschenning bij grondrechten beperkcnd ouerheitlsingrijpcn
[Adequate Legal Protection regarding Government Intervention Restricting Fundamental
Rightsl, Deventer: Kluwer 2014.
AdministrativeJurisdiction Division of the council of State, 25 April 2012, AB fiudgnentsin Adnrinistrative Lawl 2012/207 (Public Adrninisrration (probiry Screening) Actfwet
bcuodering integriteits beoortlelingen door het openbaar bestuur].
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the council of State, 1B Novernber 2015, AB
[Judgments in Administrative Law] 2016/82, annotated by Broring & Brouwer.
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requesting asylum will be more intensive than before the entry into force of Article
+O(a; of the Procedure Directive."28
However, for the rime being there has not been a fi.rndamental change of coune across
the full spectruln of adrninistrative iaw. Such change may be at hand, though: Hinch
Baliin 
- 
forrn". President of tire Adnrinistrative Jurisdiction Division - received much
supporr for his prelinrinary advice, issued as a publication of the Administrative Law
Association, entitled 'Dynaniek in de bestuursrechtspraak' [Dynamics in Administrative
Adjudication], which he defended in 2015 and in which he pleaded for a more active
role for the adlrinistrative court in a broad sense. Flirsch Ballin advocated abandoning
the Doetinchenr approach whereby discretionary powe$ conGrred in terms of its policy-
making and assessment automatically imply limited discretion by the court. Instead, he
propounded a more balanced approach in which the intensify of the review is
deterndned by considering the nanrre of the legal relationship and the weight of the
relevant interests (including ftlndamental rights) of the parties involved. In his view,
contemporary changes in constinrdonal relationships - particularly the insufHcient
democratic legitimacy of the administration as a result of the reticent, sotnecimes
careless legislature, as well as the need for an adrninistrative court that solves those
disputes and keeps the legislahrre on its toes 
- 
require thejudicial attitude to be adjusted
accordingly. Otherwise, the adnrinistration actually operates too much within a 'legal
lacuna', according to Hirsch Ballin. In the debate with Hinch Ballin, Polak (the then
President of the AdministrativeJurisdiction Division) stated that the present fomrulation
of linrited discretion may require amendment in light of these points.
Hirsch Ballin's oral arguments, which were revoltltionary in a sense, deserve to be
followed-up. In so lar as possible, adnrinistrative courts should have to render their own
ruling on the question of whether a decision is reasonable and proportionate.
Furthemrore, it is important to ensure that this does not only take place in 2 senlantic
sense. The adnrinistrative court will have to actually undentand the substance of a
dispute before rendering its own nrling and definitively resolving the dispute. In this
way, an important boost is given to the qualiry of administrative adjudication in tenls
of workmanship, justice and effectiveness, thus increasing its legitimacy. As for the
intensity of review, a tailored approach will be required, depending on the interests
involved, and the assessment of proportionality will become more prominent.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, a proper balance must thus be found
behveen the respect that the court should have for the adnrinistration's discretionary
powers in ternrs of policy and assessment on the one hand, and the interest of the
interested parties in not having their interests affected to a disproportionate degree on
the other.
Inspiration may be drawn in this respect from EU law, in which there has been a
differentiated approach regarding the intensity of review for quite some time.
Deternrining intensity is not a matter of 'all or nothing' (full review or linrited review)
but entails a tailored approach depending on the naftrre ofthe legal relationship and the
weight of the relevant interests of the parries involved.2e
21t Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, 13 April 2076, AB fiudgmerrts
in Administrative Law] 201'6/1'95, annotated by M. Reneman.
2e Ct J.H. Gerards, Het euenretligheidsbeginsel uan art. 3:4 lid 2 Awb en hct Europeserecht [The
Principle of Proportionality from Article 3:4(2) of the General Administrative Law Act and
European Law], in: T. Barkhuysen et al. (ed.), Europees recht efectuerm [Efiectuaring
Errropean law], Alphen a,/d Rijn: Kluwer 2007, pp.73-1'1'3; R. Orclep &W ' Zorg,
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ReGrence may be nnde once more at this point to a new issue in the area of deference,
namely where the linris lie as regards the adnrinistrative court's power, once a decision
has been annulled, to settle the dispute itself without reGrrinp; the matter back to the
adnrinistration. In this respect, too, the limis relate to the constitutional position of the
administration and the judiciary. But here, too, it is noticeable that in recent years thejudiciary has become more inclined to deem itself able to do so.30
6.2 But with limits, ilae to the necessary exptertise
At the same time, there is another reason why 
- 
apart from the constirudonal position
of the judiciary and its tenLrous democratic legitimary 
- 
it may be necessary to exercise
restraint in judicial review: namely, where the court lacks sufficient expertise. The ever-
increasing complexity of the administration's duties is reflected in growing
professionalisation within government, and it is beconring more and more difficllt foi
the judiciary to keep abreast of these developments.tt These matte$ also have
implications for the extensive case law of the European Court of Human Rights on
'full jurisdiction', which is also highly relevant for Dutch legal practice in this iespect.
Based on this right of 'firll jurisdiction' acknowledged in the case law of the Egropean
Court of Human Rights (reGrred to as'organe judiciaire de pleine juridicrion'in thejudgments (also) rendered in French), the national court must have jurisdiction to
exantine all issues of fict and of law that are relevant to the dispute. In this respect,
expressly no distinction is drawn berr,veen qrlestions of law and questions of fact, toth
of which may be equaily cmcial to the outcome of the clispute. 32 The colrt nrust be
able to form its own opinion on both issues, and nrust not autonutically rely on their
valuation by other authorities (in particular the adrninistration), let alone be bound by
snch. For example, irr the Dutch Terra Woninger? case, the European Court of Flrrman
Rights held that the fact that the subdistrict court in the case in hand had not fonned an
opinion of its own regarding possible soil pollution but had relied solely on the decision
of the Provinciai Executive in dris regard was contrary to this aspect of the law on
Marginalc rechterlijke toetsittg ontlar druk: een uoortgaande tred uooruit? [Limited Review uncler
Pressure: continuous Steps Folward?], in: R. ortlep et a1. (ed.), De rechter ontler uuur fTheCourt under Fire], Oister-wijk: Wolf 2016, pp. 1-18. See further, in the vein of
comparative law, S. Ranchord6s & B. de waard (eds.), TheJudge and the proporrionace
lJse of Discretion, A Comparative Study, Abingdon, Oxon/New york2016.
ct N. verheij , van grensrechter naar geschilbeslechter, Een euolutie in de Nederlandse
bestuursrechtspraak (preaduies uoor dc Vereniging uoor da Vergelijkende Studic uart het recht uart
Belgid ut Nederland) fFrom Linesman ro Dispute Adjudicator, An Evolution in Dutch
Administrative Jurisdiction (preliminary advice for the Association for the Comparative
Study of the Law of Belgium and the Netherlands], The Hague 2013: Boom.
M. Scheltma, De Hoge Raad en het olgemeen belang [lhe Supreme court and the public
Interest], in: RJ.N. Sclrlcissels et al. (ed.), De lurgerlijke rechter in het publiekrecht [The CivilCotrrt in Public Law], Devenrer: Kluwer 2015, pp.803-818.
See, for example, European Courr of Human Rights 23June 1981, A[ 19g2/602 (14
cornpte , van ltuuen €t De Meyere u Belgiwn), par. 51. The following passages are partiaily
extracted from T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Enlnerik, Europese grontlrechten en het
Nederlandse bestuursrecht. De betekenis uan het EVRM en het EIJ-Grondrechtenhattduest
[Fundarnental European Rights and Dutch Adrninistrativelaw. The Significance of the
ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundarnental Rightsl, Deventer: Kluwer 2017.
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access ro a tribunal liom Article 6 ECHR.33 According to the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, this right to 'full jurisdiction' fornx an essential characteristic
of the dght of access to a tribunal from Article 6(1) ECHR and applies to all
p.o.e",lings falling within the scope of Article 6 ECHR, in other words to all
pro..e,litrgs that entail the deternrination of civil righs and obligations or of any
crirninal charge.
While the courr is thus not permitted to blindly foliow the adnrinistrative decision, in
the case law the question often concerns the extmt to which the court may rely on the
decision of the adninistrarion. Although restrictions on judicial control of the
adnrinistrative finding of fact may be at odds with Ar-ticle 6 ECHR34, they are not
automatically impemrissible.tu Thete does have to be a convincing ground that justifies
such restrictions, such as the nafllre of the substanfive area oflaw and the adminisrrative
discretion associated with it, and the specialised narure of the finding of fact. It is
important in this respect that the administrative finding of fact took place in - quasi-
judlcial 
- 
specialist adminisrradve preparatory proceedings with suficient safeguards.36
Therefore, the restrictions on judicial control of the administrative finding of fact must
in any case never be so far-reaching that the court relies entire\ on the decision ofthe
administration. After all, that wouid mean in fact that the interested party would have
no access to the court on that point. In the context of the judicial proceedings, it must
be possible to conduct a debate regarding the correctness of the administrative finding
of fact and the manner in which it was reached. As evident frorn the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, the complete exclusion of such is unacceptable.3T
Pursuant to the right to a fair triai protected by Article 6 ECHR, the court will have to
take an active approach as regards calling witnesses who can shed light on the crucial
33 Enropean Court of Hurnan Rights 17 Decernber 1'996, NJCM-Bulletin 1'997, p. 617 et
seq., arurotated by M.L.W.M. Viering (Terra Woningen BV u the Netherlands)' See a1so, for
exanrple, European Court of Hurnan Rights 13 February 2003, AB [Judgmenrs in
Adrninistrative Law] 2004/52, arxrotated by B.W.N. de Waard (Chwrol u Ftance).
34 RJ.G.M. 'Widdershovenet al., Algetneen lrcstuursrecht 2001: hoger beroep lGener:.l
Adnrinistrative Law 2001: Appeal], The Hagre: BJu 2001, p. 37 . Cf. T. Barkhuysen,
LJ.A. Damen et al., Feitmuaststellhry in beroep, (derde eualuatie uan de Awb) [Fact Finding on
Appeal (Third Evaluation of the General Administrative Law Act)], The Hague: Bfu 2007 ,
p. 104 and the case law there cited.
3s See, in particular, European Court of Human Rights 22 November 1995, Series A. vol.
335A (Bryan u [Jnited Kingdom), and for confirrnation of the Bryan line: European Court of
Hunran Rights 7 November 2000, AB [Judgments in Adnrinistrative Law] 2003/25,
annotated by L.F.M. Verhey (Kilrysley u United Kingtlorn), confirrned in European Court of
Hrrman Rights 28 May 2002 (judgnrent of the Grand Chamber).
36 Errropean Court of Human Rights 22 November 1995, Series A vol. 335-A (Brydn u
United Kingdom); 'Widdershoven et al. 200i, pp. 34-38.
37 Ct Y.E. Schuurmans, Bewijslatuerdeling fu het bestuursrecht, Zorguuldigheid en bewijsuoering bij
heschikkingen [Division of the Burden of Proof in Administrative Law, Due Care and the
Provision ofEvidence in respect of Decisions] (dis. VU), Deventer: Kluwer 2005, pp.
290-292 and AJ. Kuipers, Het recht op full jurkdiction'[The Right to FullJurisdiction], in:
R.L. Vucs5n (ed.), De Awb-rnens: boetnan oJ undenlog? [The General Administrative Law Act
Man: Bogeyman or Underdog?] (Damen bundle), Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 1996, pp.
97-11.2. See the judgments European Court of Human Rights 17 December 1996, NJCM-
Bulleth 7997, p.61,7 et seq., annotated by M.L.W.M. Viering (Tena Woningen BV u the
Netherlantls) and European Court of Human Rights 13 February 2003, AB [fudgrnents in
Administrative Lawl2004/52, annotated by B.W.N. de Waard (Cheurol u France).
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facts lor the resolution of the dispute.38 In addition, the court cannot automarically rely
on an expert engaged by the adrninistrative body. It must attenlpt to restore the balance(in the context of the 'equality of arms') berr,veen the parties in some other way, lor
example by enabling the interested parry to enter expert evidence to the contrary, or, if
that is not possible for financial or other reasons, by engaging an expert itself3e In this
way, the court can keep a 'finger in the pie'as regards the specialised finding of fact by
the administration and safeguard the principle of equality of anns beftveen the parties as
required by Article 6 ECHR.
Thus, the division of duties berween the administration and the court as regards
findings of fact for which a certain expertise is required also involves the searrh for a
good balance and an approach that is tailored to the situation. Here, too, there seenls to
be a growing inclination amonfpt the judiciary to take a more active role than in the
past, particularly under the influence of EU law and the ECHR. In view of all these
dynamics, it may be concluded that, for the Netherlands in any event, the decision to
put the doctrine ofdeference on the agenda was a fortunate one.
European court of Human Rights 15 March 20L6, AB fiudgrnenrs in Administrative Law]
2016/132, annotated by T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emmerik (Cillissen u the Netherlantls).
European court of Human Rights 8 october 2015, AB [Judgrnents in Adnrir-ristrative
Lawl2076/167, annotated by T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emrnerik (Korosec u slouenia).
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